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0010-9452/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights resefirmly anchored within the psychiatric writings of Kraepelin,
Bonhoeffer, Pick, Van der Horst, Bleuler, Chaslin, Berlyne, andand Clinics (1912), the French psychiatrist Chaslin at the Sal-1. Introduction
If you search PubMed you find that 30 years ago (1987), only
one neuropsychological paper on confabulation was pub-
lished, the article by Kopelman distinguishing between pro-
voked and spontaneous confabulation (Kopelman, 1987).
During the course of 2016, there have been 31 papers on
confabulation to date, and in the intervening years 306
publications.
Formany years, the study of confabulation occurredwithin
the domain of psychiatry. In his pioneering studies Korsakoff
(1889), described his syndrome as a ‘psychosis’, although he
also proposed a temporal context confusion account of
confabulation (a confusion of “old recollections with present
impressions”). Although neurology was already an active
medical discipline, especially within Charcot's group at the
Salpe^triere in Paris, the study of confabulation remainedce.
c.uk (M. Kopelman).
rved.others. Although we may never know who introduced the
term ‘confabulation’ into medical discourse, potential candi-
dates include Wernicke (Wernicke, 1900) and Bonhoeffer
(Bonhoeffer, 1904). In his textbook Elements of Mental Semiology
pe^triere entitled one paragraph on confabulation as ‘Perver-
sions of memory. False memories, pseudo-reminiscences (the
Germans’ Confabulations)’. This brief title both attributes to
the Germans the origin of the term and endorses the psychi-
atric nature of this phenomenon as ‘perversions’ of memory.
The current neuropsychological interest in confabulation
can partly be traced back to Kopelman's paper (Kopelman,
1987) in which, following Bonhoeffer (1904) and Berlyne
(1972), the distinction between provoked and spontaneous
confabulations was proposed. Since then, a number of the-
ories on the origin of confabulation have been proposed, but
the distinction between provoked and spontaneous confabu-
lations, although criticized, remains a notion, which cannot
be overlooked.
As far as the mechanisms of confabulation are concerned,
four major approaches have been proposed.
Johnson argued that confabulation reflects poor source
monitoring, or reality monitoring, i.e., deciding whether a
memory is a trace of something that actually happened or is a
memory of an imagined event (Johnson, 1991). Damage to
frontal/executive functions was postulated to produce an
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confabulation.This interpretationof confabulation isconsistent
with the idea that confabulation is a form of source amnesia
(Moscovitch, 1989; Schacter, Harbluk, &McLachlan, 1984).
Moscovitch and colleagues (Gilboa, Alain, Stuss, Melo, &
Moscovitch, 2006; Moscovitch, 1989, 1995; Moscovitch &
Melo, 1997) have proposed that confabulation is the result
of a deficit in strategic retrieval. When strategic retrieval is
disrupted, following damage to the ventromedial and orbi-
tofrontal cortex, confabulation in both semantic and episodic
memory should occur, assuming that the demands of
episodic and semantic information on strategic retrieval are
matched.
In another approach to the underlying mechanisms, Dalla
Barba (2002) argued that a disruption of personal temporality
produces confabulation. This hypothesis assumes that, in
confabulating patients, knowledge of time is preserved in
that they are aware of a past, present and future. However,
they are unable to distinguish between personal habits,
repeated events and routines, on the one hand, and true
episodic memories or true personal plans, on the other. In
spite of some important differences, this theory is not
incompatible with the theory proposed by Schnider and co-
workers which posits that confabulators suffer from a
deficit of reality filtering and fail to suppress inappropriate
memory traces (Bouzerda-Wahlen, Nahum, Liverani,
Guggisberg, & Schnider, 2015).
A fourth approach involves a motivational account,
arguing that confabulation results from patients' tendency to
embellish their memories in order to protect the ‘self’, driven
by wishful thinking (Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou,
Conway, & Solms, 2007).
The idea for this Special Issue was proposed by one of the
guest editors (GDB) and was enthusiastically accepted by
Sergio Della Sala. Our aim was not to provide answers to all
the open questions concerning confabulation, but instead to
reflect the theoretical and experimental work of some of the
major contributors to this topic. Only one paper on confabu-
lation was published in 1987, 31 in 2016 and 16 in this issue.
Confabulation is no longer a psychiatric phenomenon, or a
clinical anecdote. It is addressed in neuropsychological and
experimental terms; and theorists attempt to understandwhy
individuals, brain damaged or not, make errors in
remembering.2. In this issue
This issue consists of 16 papers covering awide range of topics
and employing different techniques. Here we provide a very
brief summary of the papers and then raise some questions
for future research.
The involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex in confabula-
tion has repeatedly been proposed. Schnider and co-workers
in their article provide a review of their theory, which pro-
poses that what they call ‘behaviorally spontaneous confab-
ulation’, in which patients tend to act according to their
confabulatory beliefs, results froma deficit in ‘reality filtering’.
This, in turn, is a consequence of a lesion to the orbitofrontal
cortex.Gilboa and Moscovitch suggest that the ventro-medial
frontal cortex (vmPFC) establishes context relevant tem-
plates, andmediates decision-monitoring processes to ensure
that only context-relevant responses are enacted. Using EEG
techniques, they provide evidence for this hypothesis in pa-
tients with vmPFC damage and confabulation.
Bajo and co-workers investigated the cognitive and
emotional factors associated with the presence and clinical
course of confabulation with follow-up over 9 months. Their
findings show that the severity of memory impairment
(especially on autobiographical memory) and errors in exec-
utive tests (particularly in making cognitive estimates) are
strongly associated with the severity of confabulation scores
at baseline and also changes through time. Their findings
suggest that confabulation results from executive dysfunction
where autobiographical memory is also impaired (compare
Johnson, O'Connor, & Cantor, 1997), and it resolves when
these impairments subside.
Whilst Bajo et al. found that confabulations in general tend
to decline, Dalla Barba et al. found that many confabulations
were both consistent and persistent through time, the pa-
tients giving the same confabulations to the same questions
over time. This was particularly true where habits and
repeated personal events were mistaken as specific, unique
personal episodes, or as well-known public events where se-
mantic knowledge was implicated. Such errors occur within
Temporal Consciousness, in which individuals normally
remember their personal past, are oriented in the present
world, and predict their personal future.
Turnbull describes the ‘emotion dysregulation’ hypothesis
in the origin of confabulation (compare Conway & Tacchi,
1996; Fotopoulou et al., 2007). He develops the idea that the
positive aspects of confabulatory states may have a role in
perpetuating the imbalance between cognitive control and
emotions. He identifies three main causal factors: that posi-
tive emotions are related tomore global or schematic forms of
cognitive processing; that positive emotions influence the
accuracy of memory recollection; and that positive emotions
make people more susceptible to false memories.
Coltheart has distinguished between spontaneous
confabulation, on the one hand, and two types of provoked
confabulation, on the other. The latter he labels as ‘memory-
recall provoked confabulation’ and ‘question-provoked
confabulation’, and he explores the latter in detail. He argues
for a broader conception of confabulation, seen also in healthy
people as part of “a drive for understanding”.
Venneri et al. have compared resting state fMRI in 18
confabulating Alzheimer patients (AD) and 18 non-
confabulating AD patients. They found that confabulatory
tendencies in early AD are associated with a disconnection
between computational hubs in frontal and medio-
temporal regions, coupled with up-regulation of frontal
activation, especially in the midline and anterior cingulate
regions.
Spitzer and co-workers investigated confabulation in
autistic adolescents. This is a largely unexplored domain. The
authors administered executive tests, and a questionnaire
aimed at eliciting confabulation, to their patients and to a
group of normal controls. On the basis of their results, the
authors suggest the possibility that, in at least some cases,
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than to impaired source memory or poor executive function.
McDermott and co-workers investigated a phenomenon
related to confabulation, namely false recognition, using the
well-known DeeseeRoedigereMcDermott paradigm, specif-
ically conceived to elicit false recognition. The question
addressed was whether novel words, which are subjectively
experienced as having been recently studied, would elicit the
parietal memory network activation in the same way as ‘hits’.
Their interesting result is that true old items and false alarms
activated similarly the parietal memory network.
Garrison et al. carried out an experiment in healthy par-
ticipants, finding that source memory was less accurate for
auditory stimuli than visual stimuli with a greater rate of
externalization than internalization. They argued that the
findings were consistent with the greater prevalence of clin-
ical auditory, rather than visual, reality discrimination errors,
which they argued were relevant to confabulations, halluci-
nations, and delusions.
Feinberg and Roane studied 4 patients with delusional
misidentification for persons and/or confabulation about
‘phantom’ persons and prominent ‘self-referential’ narratives.
They compared these cases with 4 cases of delusional misiden-
tification for persons and/or confabulation about ‘phantom’
persons who lacked self-referential symptoms. They argued for
a role of psychological defence in the self-referential cases.
Bertrand et al. have provided a valuable translation of
Arnaud's (1900) description of a case of persistent deja vu, and
a very helpful discussion and interpretation of this case in the
light of modern neuropsychological findings. They argue that
the psychopathology is best understood as a form of memory
disorder, a reduplicative paramnesia, best described as ‘rec-
ollective confabulation’.
Turner et al. have also described deja vecu or recollective
confabulation as instances in which the sense of deja vu is
persistent and convincing. Their patient's deja vecu experi-
ences were entirely restricted to non-personal events, sug-
gesting that there are differences in the degree to which
personal and emotional associations are formed for autobio-
graphical and non-autobiographical episodic memories. They
propose a two-factor theory of deja vecu.
In a very different context, Gudjonsson describes a ‘mem-
ory distrust syndrome’, which can lead to false confession
which, in turn, can be internalized and described as a
‘confabulation’. He has described a case in which solitary
confinement and other contextual risk factors, personal
vulnerability, and the acute mental state led to the gradual
development of a memory distrust syndrome. He warns that
this can occur in intellectually able and educated individuals.
We asked Paolo Bartolomeo to write an article on confab-
ulation following right brain damage. He and his colleagues
argue that confabulation can occur in patients with right
hemisphere damage. They are not ‘memory confabulations’,
but these patients may be unaware of their left hemiplegia,
and confabulate about it, denying the ownership of their left
limb. The authors review this literature and propose that
confabulation in right brain damage might reflect, at least
partially, the attempts of the left hemisphere tomake sense of
inappropriate input received from the damaged right
hemisphere.Finally, Martinaud et al. have also examined bodily
‘ownership’ in right hemisphere lesions. They have con-
trasted the visual capture effect in ‘ownership’ of a rubber
handwith disturbance in the sense of somatic ownership. The
former they relate to pathology in a fronto-parietal network,
and the latter to more posterior lesions including the right
temporo-parietal junction and supramarginal gyrus.3. Issues and controversies
Common themes in this Special Issue have included the
assumption of different subtypes of confabulation, the
importance of realitymonitoring, the critical nature of damage
to the orbito-frontal or ventro-medial prefrontal cortex in at
least some cases, and the scope for either broadening the
concept of confabulation or, at least, investigating related
phenomena. However, despite the increasing interest and
literature on confabulation, and the effortmade in this Special
Issue, thereare still anumberof issues that remainunresolved.
One is how broadly or narrowly we should use the word
‘confabulation’ itself. Kopelman (2010) argued for a narrow
definition, related to false or erroneous memories arising un-
intentionally in the context of a neurological amnesia. He
believed that confabulation should be kept distinct from de-
lusions, delusional memories, or other phenomena such as
anosognosia, because incorporating them risks a loss of
meaning in conflating what might be rather different phe-
nomena with distinct underlying bases. Others in this volume
(e.g., Coltheart) have taken a different view, arguing that
confabulation is ageneralpropertyofhumancognitionand the
‘drive for causal understanding’; andGudjonssonhas related it
to the phenomenon of (‘internalised’) false confession.
A second issue, within the topic of ‘memory confabulation’
itself, is the question of how many subtypes of confabulation
are useful, and are they truly distinct, or should they be
viewed as lying along a single dimension? Berlyne (1972) and
Kopelman (1987) postulated two types; Coltheart postulates
three subtypes (spontaneous and two types of provoked); and
Schnider (2008) has argued for four subtypes (intrusions/
simple provoked, momentary, fantastic, and behaviorally
spontaneous). Whilst others have raised legitimate questions
about how distinct these subtypes of confabulation really are,
further categories have been offered in this Special Issue (e.g.,
the notion of ‘recollective confabulation’). Should we be
thinking in terms of a dimension or continuum of provoked
versus spontaneous confabulation, manifest in either
thought/recollection and/or action? But what does this do to
Kopelman's (and now Coltheart's) underlying assumption of
provoked confabulation as a component of normal cognitive
processes versus spontaneous confabulation as a phenome-
non that is specifically pathological, related to underlying
brain disease?
Another issue concerns the quantification of confabula-
tion. At present, it is seldom specified how much the patients
described in the literature are confabulating. The result is that
patients who may produce one or two confabulations are
compared with patients who confabulate across the board on
objective measures of confabulation, such as the confabula-
tion battery (Dalla Barba, 1993; Dalla Barba&Decaix, 2009). It is
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comparing patients with one or two anomias in spontaneous
speech with patients who have an amnestic aphasia. Can
sensible conclusions on the mechanisms of confabulation
really be drawn by describing, studying and comparing pa-
tients in whom confabulations are not quantified?
A further question concerns what role and weight should
be attributed to frontal dysfunction in confabulation. If it is
uncontroversial that some patients with frontal lesions (or
executive dysfunction) confabulate, it is also the case that
confabulations have been observed following lesions in at
least other 19 posterior and subcortical sites. Moreover, for
confabulation to occur, the hippocampus must be, at least
partially, preserved (Dalla Barba & La Corte, 2013). So, are
frontal lesions really necessary and sufficient for confabula-
tion to occur, or should other brain lesions, as well as the
sparing of the hippocampi, be taken into account in a general
theory of confabulation?
These issues and otherswill continue to be debated, as well
as those thrown up by related phenomena, including de-
lusions, deja vecu, and anososgnosia. The increasing literature
on these issues will, we hope, lead to a better taxonomy and
understanding of these phenomena.r e f e r e n c e s
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